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A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the
State Farm and Grove City Cases
RAFAEL GELY AND PABLO T SPILLER
University of Illinois

1. INTRODUCTION
The nature and process of the main regulatory changes of the last decade
represent a challenge for political economists. Not only were major deregulatory processes undertaken without the active support of the regulated
industries, but the process itself by which deregulation and regulation developed through the 1970s and 1980s is puzzling. While Congress legislated
regulatory and deregulatory changes in some areas (e.g., airlines, trucking,

cable, oil), in many other areas regulation and deregulation were promoted
and carried out by agencies and the courts, without much active legislative
change (e.g., telecommunications, pollution control).
The seeming inaction of Congress in the face of rapid regulatory changes,
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introduced by regulatory agencies and the courts, has been the
subject of
much recent research (see, e.'g., McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast,
1987,
1989; Weingast, 1981, 1984; Weingast and Moran; Ferejohn and
Shipan;
McCubbins and Schwartz). This research has emphasized the agency
relationship among the regulatory or administrative agencies, Congress,
and the
President. The role of the courts, however, has been mostly unexplored
in
this literature, except for the work of McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast
(1987,
1989) and Marks. The former develop a framework where the courts
are seen
as indirect agents of Congress, in charge of supporting the interests
of the
coalition that enacted the original legislation. Marks, on the other
band,
models the impact of judicial decisions on regulatory legislation.
His main
insight, which we borrow heavily from, is that the bicameral nature
of Congress increases the set of Court decisions that are invulnerable to
legislative
action. In his framework, however, the Court is unconcerned with
the impact of its decisions on the legislative process. Neither Marks nor
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989) consider, and explore the implications
of, the conditions for the justices to behave in the way the models
stipulate.
The role of the Supreme Court in the design of public policy has,
on the
other hand, attracted much academic attention. The emphasis, however,
has
been basically normative. Particular attention has been given to
the normative properties of different institutional arrangements-for
example,
whether the Supreme Court should follow a restrained or activist
policy.1
Whether any of those institutional arrangements would actually be
carried
out by self-interested agents, again, has not been analyzed.
In this article we follow the recent developments of the modern theory
of
administrative agencies, by developing a rational choice theory of
the Supreme Court. Our framework combines two of the main characteristics
of
this literature: namely, the rational choice modeling strategy with
the notion
that institutions matter in the design of public policy. We differ basically
by
modeling the Supreme Court as a self-interested, ideologically motivated
institution, making its decisions subject not to the traditional legal
rules of
precedent, but to the constraints arising from the political interests
of other
institutions of government-namely, Congress and the President. 2
1. There has been a long-standing debate about whether the Court must

follow an "activist" or "restrained" path. For recent surveys of the different approaches
to the analysis of the
Supreme Court, see Rohde and Spaeth, Halpern and Lamb, and
Wasby. Among the classic
positive approaches to the Supreme Court is that of Dahl, who claims
that, because of their
recruitment, the justices are a reflection of the electorate, and they
play a "legitimizing" role.
Dahl's hypothesis was later expanded by Funston to reconcile short-term
disagreements between the Court and Congress. An alternative view of the Supreme
Court is provided in
Adamany, who claims that the Court constitutes a force for instability.
2. Our Supreme Court resembles, then, in many respects the description
of an "activist"
court. In this sense, our Court also resembles the view of the
Court held by critical legal
scholars. Our approach, however, is radically different from theirs,
as we develop the positive
implications of such a behavioral assumption, rather than dealing
with normative behavioral
alternatives, not rooted in a microanalytic framework.
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While we do not claim that this is the most realistic description of the
actual workings of the Supreme Court, our model provides a simple positive
framework that is rich enough to analyze and forecast changes over time in
the behavior of the Court and in the determinants of public policy. Furthermore, many of the implications of the model are consistent with much of the
current political wisdom on the role of the different political institutions, and
are also empirically refutable.
We apply this approach to the analysis of two recent Supreme Court
statutory decisions, the State Farm and Grove City decisions. We show that
both Supreme Court decisions can be understood as the Court reacting
strategically to changes in the relevant political constraints reflecting
changes in both Congress and the Presidency, and not necessarily to legal
precedent or to Congressional intent. Also, even though these two decisions
can be seen as favoring different political tendencies, they are both consistent with a self-interested but politically moderate Supreme Court. While
our analysis of these two Supreme Court decisions does not constitute an
empirical test of our theory, it shows its potential usefulness to explain and
forecast Supreme Court decisions.
While we argue in this article that the behavior of the Court can be understood as that of a self-interested, politically motivated actor, the justices'
calculus differs from that of members of Congress. Unlike members of Congress, the Court does not necessarily have a relevant constituency whose
interests it needs to consider in rendering its opinions. 3 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court decisions are not taken in a political vacuum. The ability of
other political actors to take actions to reverse the Supreme Court decisions is
what constrains the scope and power of the Court.
While constitutional limits are important, 4 we focus here on the constraints on the Court's interpretation of statutes that result from the institutional structure of government (e.g., Congressional jurisdictional rules, the
committee system, bicameralism, the President's veto power). 5
While simple, our framework has several implications that could, in principle, be subject to empirical testing. 6 First, in our framework the Supreme
Court "reads election results," as, even without changes in its composition,
3. Unlike members of Congress, or the President, who are directly elected in popular
elections, the Supreme Court justices are not subject to the direct impact of electoral forces.
Furthermore, interest groups do not have the same direct impact in the Court as they have in
Congress. Their role in the judicial process is limited to their participation as litigants in cases
where they might be directly involved, or, to the filing of "amicus briefs," in cases in which they
might have interests at stake.
4. See, for example, Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, and Washy.
5. Although these institutional arrangements have been studied within the Congressional
context (e.g., Shepsle and Weingast, 1981, 1982; Weingast and Moran), few attempts have been
made to analyze their effects on Supreme Court decisions. See, however, Marks, who analyzes
the effect of Congress on the Supreme Court's decisions.
6. See Spiller and Gely (1990a) for an attempt to test empirically this approach using laborrelations cases.
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the Court is responsive to changes in the electorate. 7 The impact of the
electorate or of interest groups, however, is indirect, and it is effected through
changes in the constraints faced by the Court, following changes in the
composition of Congress and in the Executive. Second, our model provides an
explanation for the conventional wisdom that to a large extent the most
important domestic role of the President is to appoint justices to the Court. In
our framework, in the absence of veto power, the Supreme Court eliminates
most of the President's discretionary power. With veto power, however, the
President's views carry substantially more weight in determining the equilibrium. Third, the Supreme Court, in our framework, may increase or
decrease the extent of policy stability. By reducing the power of the President,
the Court may increase policy stability. On the other hand, the Court may also
promote policy changes, as changes in the composition of Congress open the
possibility for the Supreme Court to modify the status quo. 8, 9 The Court,
however, will follow a more 'restrained" path in periods of Congressional
stability Thus, this model of the Supreme Court, which in principle resembles an activist Court, predicts that the Court will play different roles depending on the composition of (and changes in) Congress. The Supreme Court,
however, whether "restrained" or "activist," will usually follow electoral
changes. Yet an "activist" Court is nothing more than a Court siding with one
of the houses of Congress, or with the President.
Finally, the model predicts that Congressional inaction will follow Supreme Court decisions, as these have already taken the composition of Congress into account.
2. THE THEORY
We develop here a simple model of the Supreme Court-Congress-President relationship. We focus on statutory rather than Constitutional issues. In
Gely and Spiller (1989) we expand this framework to the analysis of Constitutional interpretations.

7. This result is similar to that advocated by many political and legal scholars (e.g.,
Funston; Handberg and Hill, 1980, 1984). We differ, however, in providing a microanalytic
foundation to that claim. Furthermore, previous positive political analyses of the Supreme
Court have focused, almost exclusively, on the impact of "realigning elections" on Supreme
Court decisions, suggesting that those are the times when the Court and Congress will disagree
(e.g., Handberg and Hill, 1984; and Adamany). Our result, however, is different. Various
degrees of changes in the political system, not only drastic electoral results, may open opportunities for the Court to become more "active," and to affect the status quo.
8. See Marks for a related analysis.
9. It is usually claimed, for example, that, so as to retain its political capital, the Court will
strategically retreat from politically untenable positions. See, for example, Nagel, Adamany, and
Funston. While important in principle, we do not consider here reputational considerations in
Supreme Court decisions.
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Our analysis is based on several simplifying assumptions concerning our
four players: the House, the Senate, the President, and the Supreme Court.
Our first set of assumptions concerns Congressional and Presidential preferences. We start by assuming a bicameral legislature, with both houses of
Congress having well-defined and stable preferences over the policy space
(R2), represented by strictly convex indifference contours (in particular,
without loss of generality, we will assume them to be circular). The modern
theory of Congressional institutions (e.g., Weingast and Marshall; Shepsle
and Weingast, 1987, 1989) suggests that committees have substantial power
over the issues under their jurisdiction. In particular, because of their
gatekeeping and veto power (i.e., they may block legislation from being
introduced, as well as kill or modify legislation in conference), committee
members' preferences may dominate issue-specific legislation. Furthermore,
if committee membership is not random, but rather is the result of a selfselection process (see Shepsle, and Weingast and Marshall), then committees will tend to be relatively more homogeneous in their issue-specific
preferences than their respective chambers as a whole. Thus, our assumption about legislators' preferences is equivalent to assuming full control of
legislature outcomes by the relevant committees. 10 Seen in this light, these
11
assumptions may not drastically violate reality We further assume that the
President also has well-defined and stable preferences over the policy space,
represented by circular isopreference contours.
Our second set of assumptions concerns the preferences of the Supreme
Court. We assume that the Court has well-defined and stable preferences
over the policy space, which is also represented by strictly convex indifference curves. The source of the Court's preferences, however, is different
12
from that of the legislators. While legislators "vote their district,"' Supreme
Court justices are not subject to reelection. We assume, then, that the
Court's preferences are essentially ideologically based. 13 Our assumption
about the Court's preferences is similar to assuming that the Court is a single
individual. This is a strong assumption as we assume multidimensional issues
4
and, hence, the median voter theorem may not readily be applied. 1 We
10. For an extension of this framework to alternative models of Congressional decisionmaking, see Spiller (1990a).
11. See, however, Gilligan and Krehbiel for a different view of committee composition.
12. See Fiorina, Kalt and Zupan, Kau and Rubin, and Peltzman, for empirical tests of this
proposition.
13. While the justices' monetary well-being may be unrelated to the issue in question, it is
nevertheless reasonable to assume that they may have strong views about the substance of the
case. Furthermore, political considerations form part of the appointment process, making it
important to consider the political preferences of the justices. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that Supreme Court justices have stable preferences over the policy space.
14. For a discussion of this issue as it applies to analyses of the Court, see Easterbrook.
Spiller and Gely (1990b), however, provide conditions under which the median voter result can
be applied to a multidimensional bargaining game between the Court and Congress.
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furthermore assume that the Court dislikes being reversed by Congress.15
Finally, we perform our analysis under two alternative assumptions about
the nature of decisions the Court can take. Most of the ensuing analysis is
carried on assuming that the Court is free to make its decisions on a continuum, rather than just on a yes-or-no basis. 16 At the end of this section we

extend this framework by allowing the Court only to make decisions on a
yes-or-no basis.
Thus, each actor has an ideal point in R2. We call HS,P, and SC the ideal
points of the House, the Senate, the President, and the Supreme Court,
respectively
We focus on policy-making. Policy can be made by a specific legislative
act, by the actions of an administrative agency (i.e., a Presidential policy), 17
or by a Supreme Court decision. The role of the Supreme Court is to review

administrative agencies' decisions, and in this way to define the policy that
would take effect unless it is reversed by a joint action of the House, the

Senate, and the President. The role of the President in our model is twofold:
on the one hand, to interpret and implement Congressional decisions
through administrative agencies; and, on the other hand, if it can and so

desires, to veto Congressional decisions.
2.1.

LONG-RUN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT PRESIDENTIAL VETO

There are many ways of modeling the interaction among Congress, the
President, and the Court. Here we consider a simple bargaining game
among the House, the Senate, the President, and the Supreme Court, assuming first that the President does not have the power to sustain a veto.
15. That lower-court justices dislike being reversed is quite understandable, as their reputation may be related to how often they are reversed by superior courts. In the case of the
Supreme Court, a similar rationale can be provided in a more general framework than the one
we present here, one where Court legitimacy and credibility are important factors that cannot
be taken for granted. In other words, a model of political institutions is needed where their
relative powers are the result of some underlying game. Here, for example, we assume that
what the Court says is actually the law, unless it is reversed by Congress. This assumes, for
example, that the police will enforce the law. If the Court's legitimacy and credibility were
extremely poor, then it is possible that their decisions will carry no weight in public decisionmaking, and our model would have no predictive power.
16. There are several reasons why this assumption may be proper. First, the Court is free to
interpret in its own way each case that comes to it. Second, the decision to grant cert allows the
Court to choose that case that fits its preferred outcome. Finally, it can use dicta to call for a
particular type of case. Note, however, that, as we show below, should the Court constraint itself
to decide cases on a yes-or-no basis, then the equilibrium will change.
17. We assume that administrative agencies, whether independent regulatory agencies or
part of the executive branch, are fully controlled by the President. This assumption, which is
counter to much of the recent literature on regulatory agencies (e.g., McCubbins and Schwartz;
Weingast and Moran; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987; Spiller, 1990b), is taken exclusively to simplify the analysis. As the analysis below will show, this assumption does not
materially change the results.
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We model the game in three stages with the President moving first, the
8
Court second, and Congress last. 1 In the first stage, the President, through
the administrative agencies, implements a statute. This implementation is
then subject to review by the Court, which in turn determines the legal
status quo. The Court's decision may leave the administrative interpretation
standing, or may replace it with an alternative interpretation. In the third
stage, the House and the Senate bargain. If they reach an agreement different from the current status quo (i.e., the Court's decision), then that agreement becomes the law. If they fail to reach an agreement different from the
Supreme Court's decision, then the latter becomes the equilibrium.
To solve this game we work backward by first describing the bargaining
problem between the House and the Senate corresponding to the final stage
in the game. We assume that the outcome to the bargaining between the
House and the Senate is Pareto efficient, in the sense that no other alternative outcome could improve the utility of one of the houses of Congress
9
without reducing the utility of the other. 1 In other words, we assume thai
the outcome to the bargaining between the two houses of Congress is oi
their contract curve, which we denominate by C(H,S). We also assumc
individual rationality, so that the bargaining process cannot make any of the
two houses worse off than the status quo.
Thus, only points in C(H,S) are feasible equilibria. Consider a case where
the Court's initial decision was outside C(H,S). Since there is always a poin
in C(H,S) preferred by both the House and the Senate to a given poini
outside it, bargaining between the two will bring about a point on C(H,S).
Thus, the equilibrium to this game has to reside in C(H,S). The Suprem(
Court, then, cannot force a policy outcome outside C(H, S), as the House anc
the Senate can always agree on a point on the contract curve that will mak(
them better off. 20 Similarly, the President cannot administratively imple.
18. Alternative sequences could easily be conceived. Games where either the Court or thl
President move last, however, are less interesting as, given our preference assumptions, the'
would always be able to implement their ideal points. Since most statutory cases deal with th,
Court scrutinizing administrative agencies' decisions, our assumption of the administrativ,
agency (i.e., the President) moving first is quite realistic. One could model a four-stage game
where, in the first stage, Congress passes a law, then the agency and the Court move sequen
tially, and, finally, the game ends with Congress moving again. This game, however, yield
exactly the same outcome as the three-stage game described in the text.
19. This is not such an unreasonable solution. First, the Nash-bargaining solution concept i
efficient. Furthermore, other bargaining structures have the Nash-bargaining solution as a limi
case. See Binmore.
20. If the Supreme Court would try to impose its ideal point SC as the policy outcome, i
will face a reversal by Congress. If the Supreme Court tries again, after being reversed, t,
impose its ideal point as the policy outcome, both houses of Congress will support a constitu
tional amendment to limit further the power of the Court. Observe, however, that if th
Supreme Court's decision changes the status quo from one point to another, both in the contrac
curve, no constitutional conflict would arise because one house of Congress is necessarily mad
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ment any policy outside C(H,S), as either a Court or a Congressional decision will reverse it. Given that the outcome to the third stage is in C(H,S),
the Court's decision will take into account the correspondence between the
initial status quo and the final congressional bargaining outcome. Since any
point outside C(H,S) will be reversed by Congress, and given that the Court
prefers not to be reversed, it will make its decision such that the policy
outcome is on the contract curve between the House and the Senate. In this
way Congress cannot agree on a different outcome, and the Court's decision
becomes the law. The Court then will pick a point on C(H,S) that maximizes
its own utility. This point will become the equilibrium.
Observe, furthermore, that if only a single point in C(H, S) maximizes the
Court's preferences, then the President has no power, as the Court's action is
independent of the initial status quo set out by the agency. 9 That is, in the
absence of a Presidential veto, long-run political equilibria are determined
exclusively by the preferences of the House, the Senate, and the Supreme
Court. The President's current preferences, on the other hand, are inconsequential in determining long-run policies. In the bargaining game among the
Court, Congress, and the President, the latter's role can simply be seen as
that of providing a policy offer. If the offer is in C(H,S) and is the one most
preferred by the Court, then that offer becomes the equilibrium. If it is not
in C(H, S) or is not the same as the reversal point chosen by the Court, it will
be reversed, by either the Court or Congress. Thus, the presence of the
Supreme Court eliminates the power of the Executive.
The President, however, would have played a substantial role in determining the final equilibrium outcome in the absence of Supreme Court
scrutiny. In this case, the President, through control of the executive agencies, could determine which policy point in the contract curve is actually
implemented-hence, choosing that point in C(H,S) that maximizes his or
her own utility. See point El in Figure IA. In the absence of the Supreme
Court, then, the Executive seems to have actual power. As discussed above,
however, this result is reversed with the introduction of the Supreme Court.
The following Proposition summarizes the determinants of long-run political equilibria.
Proposition 1. Given the preferences and bargaining structure described
above, and assuming that the President does not have veto power, a long-run
3etter off by the Supreme Court move. See Wasby and Casper for discussions of the constituional implications of a "ruling-response-ruling-response" sequence. See also Hensehen.
21. If circular congressional preferences are assumed, then C(H,S) is linear and, given our
issumption about the convexity of the Court's preferences, there is indeed a single point in
?(H,S) that maximizes the Court's preferences. If, however, C(H,S) is not linear, and there are
'nultiple equilibria to this game, then the President, through the administrative agencies, could
ictually pick that equilibrium that maximizes his or her own utility.
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X1
S.
E1

H

x2
B

P

E2

x2
Figure 1. Political equilibrium (A) without and (B) with the Supreme Court. H: ideal point ol
the House; S:ideal point of the Senate; P: ideal point of the President; SC: ideal point of th
Supreme Court; Ej: equilibrium without the Court; E 2: equilibrium with the Court.

political equilibrium is a feasible political outcome22 such that no alternative
policy could make the Supreme Court better off.
That is, a long-run equilibrium is that point in the contract curve betweer
the House and the Senate that maximizes the utility of the Court (E2 ir
Figure 1B).
To understand the equilibrium to the game, it may be useful to analyze ar
example. Consider a case where neither the Supreme Court nor the President may have substantial influence on legislative outcomes (i.e., when th(
22. Formally, X* represents a long-run political equilibrium, if X* = {XJX = Argmax USC(x)
s.t. x E C(H,S)}.
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Figure 2. The Supreme Court and policy stability. H: ideal point of the House; S1: initial ideal
point of the Senate; S2 : subsequent ideal point of the Senate; P: ideal point of the President; SC:
ideal point of the Supreme Court; R: President's most preferred point on the Senate's indifference curve through E; E: initial equilibrium; E 2 : subsequent equilibrium.

ideal points of both the House and the Senate are the same). Then, the longrun equilibrium is represented by their ideal point (E,), as in Figure 2.
Figure 2 also depicts the positions of the President (P) and of the Supreme
Court (SC). Assume now that, as the result of elections, the Senate changed
drastically, with its new ideal point closer to that of the President. In the
absence of any Supreme Court action, the House will block any new legislation that will change the status quo away from E 1. The President, however,
could alter the implementation of the legislation. A policy point like I 1
leaves the Senate indifferent between the legal status quo (E1 ) and the actual
implementation (R1). Since the President is better off at P, it could be
undertaken by an executive agency with the Senate blocking legislation to
restore the status quo. 2 3 The Senate, however, could offer the House to
legislate S2 as the legal standard. Such a policy would be preferred by the
House to, say, P, or to any other point in the contract curve between the
President and the Senate. Thus, S2 becomes the legal standard. The President, then, shifted the equilibrium from E1 to S 2 . That is, in the absence of
23. The agency, however, may still face problems with Congress if the committee that
oversees it does not support its policies. While the committee may not be able to force the
agency to reverse its policy, it may try to influence the agency in different ways. Budgetary
decisions as well as oversight activities may substantially disturb the agency's operations. See
Spiller (1990b), and references therein.
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the Supreme Court, the President could have a strong impact on public
policy.
Let us now introduce the Supreme Court. In Figure 2, the position of the
Supreme Court has improved following the elections, since there are points
along the new contract curve between the House and the Senate that provide
it with a utility level above that of E 1, Given the new location of the Senate,
the Supreme Court's best choice is a point like E 2 , on the new contract curve
between the House and the Senate.
E 2 , then, becomes the equilibrium independent of the ideal point of the
President. The President, however, appoints justices to the court. To the
his
extent that the President can appoint justices with preferences similar to
24
or her own, the President may have a lasting impact on public policy.
2.2.

COMPARATIVE STATICS

The model just described can be used to understand changes in the position
of the Supreme Court, even in the absence of changes in its composition.
Proposition 1 implies that, in the absence of Presidential veto power, we do
not have to consider the President's preferences for the purpose of analyzing
the comparative statics properties of our model. Consider, for example, an
initial long-run equilibrium, El, where the House and the Senate are as
depicted in Figure 3. Let the results of an election imply a large change in
the composition and preferences of the House. Since the Senate has not
changed, any new legislative equilibrium (in the absence of any Supreme
Court ruling) should reside in the new contact curve between the House and
the Senate [C(H 2 , S1)], and, in particular, in the bargaining area defined by
E 1 . The fact that the Senate did not change restricts the extent of policy
change that can develop in the absence of Supreme Court intervention.
Figure 3 shows, for example, that the new long-run equilibrium may well be
outside that area, with the new long-run equilibrium, ED closer to the new
ideal point of the House. Thus, the Supreme Court will usually follow the
voters. This is, however, a qualified statement. Proposition 2, below, presents the conditions under which the Supreme Court follows the electorate.
Proposition 2. Assume that (a) preferences of the House, the Senate, and
the Supreme Court are represented by circular indifference curves in R2; (b)
the initial equilibrium is in the interior of the contract curve, then moves
in the electorate where either only one house moves or both houses move in
24. We do not analyze here the selection of justices to the Supreme Court. Our previous
discussion, though, suggests that it is not in the interest of the Senate to ratify the President's
selection without considering the preferences of the candidate at hand. A full analysis of this
topic is left, however, for future research.
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Figure 3. Comparative statics on the House's ideal point. SC: ideal point of the Supreme Court;
H1: initial ideal point of the House; H 2: subsequent ideal point of the House; S1: ideal point of
the Senate; El: initial equilibrium; E2 : subsequent equilibrium.

the same direction will imply changes in the long-run equilibrium which will
follow the electorate, unless the change is in only one house; and (a) the
dimension that changes is one that separates the House from the senate the
most; and (b) the initial status quo implies a larger equilibrium value for that
dimension than that of the ideal point of the Supreme Court.
Proposition 2, proved in the Appendix, shows 25 that the Supreme Court
does not follow the electoral results only when (a) the electoral change implies a shift in, say, the House's ideal point along a dimension over which the
House and the Senate were already far apart; and (b) the initial equilibrium
value of that dimension exceeds the value for the ideal point of the Supreme
Court.26 Otherwise, the Supreme Court follows the electorate.
2.3.

THE VALUE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO

The model discussed above can be expanded to account for a more active
Presidential role. Here, we explore the implications to the bargaining game
previously analyzed by providing the President with veto power.
Presidential veto power expands the area of feasible legislative outcomes.
To model the ability of the President to veto legislation, we follow McCub-

25. The proposition assumes circular preferences, a common assumption in spatial political
models.
26. The first condition relates to the steepness of the contract curve, while the second
condition relates to the position of the Supreme Court's ideal point in relation to the initial
contract curve.
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Figure 4. Feasible and long-run equilibria with Presidential veto power. H: ideal point of the
House; S: ideal point of the Senate; SC: ideal points of the Supreme Court; P: ideal point of the
President.

bins, Noll, and Weingast (1989) by assuming that any legislation must have
the agreement of the House, the Senate, and the President. 27 In other
words, any new legislation (and, in particular, any legislation to reverse the
Court) cannot make any of the three actors worse off. Thus, we have to
modify the third stage of the bargaining game in the previous section. Now it
consists of bargaining among the House, the Senate, and the President.
We assume, again, that the outcome to the third-stage bargaining process
is Pareto efficient and satisfies individual rationality constraints. Thus, all
feasible legislative outcomes must reside (weakly) inside the area delineated
by the three relevant contract curves [C(H,S), C(H,P), C(S,P); see Figure 4].
Call the set of feasible legislative outcomes W(H,S,P). The outcome of the
three-sided bargaining game will depend on the relative bargaining positions
of the three players. All we can say is that for a legislative, or administrative,
action to constitute an equilibrium it must be in W(H,S,P).
The introduction of the Supreme Court provides a particular equilibrium
to the game. As before, it is straightforward to see that a long-run political
equilibrium is a feasible political equilibrium such that no alternative policy
will make the Supreme Court better off, 2 8 and this is depicted in Figure 4.
27. Since we are modeling the House and the Senate as having well-specified preference
orderings, we are focusing essentially on the preferences of the relevant committee with jurisdiction over the issues in question. We are, thus, not assuming that all, say, Senators have
homogenous preferences. If that were the case, then Congress could overrule a Presidential
veto. If Congress' preferences reflect only those of the relevant committees, they do not necessarily imply the existence of supermajorities in both houses and, hence, there is a role to the
Presidential veto.
28. Formally, X* is a long-run political equilibrium, if X* E {XJX = Argmax USC(x), s.t. x E

W(H,S,P)}.
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Again, the initial Presidential decision in the first stage is inconsequential,
as it would be reversed by the Court if it did not maximize the Court's
preferences.
We can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (a) If SC E W(H,S,P), then SC is a long-run political
equilibrium.
(b) If SC E W(H,S,P), then the long-run equilibrium is in the boundary
of W(H,S,P).
The first result simply states that if the ideal point of the Supreme Court
is located inside the set of feasible equilibria, then through judicial intervention, the Supreme Court will make its ideal point the long-run legislative
outcome. If, however, SC is outside the set of feasible equilibria, then the
long-run equilibrium is on a contract curve between any two of the three
political actors.

To prove the proposition, consider first the case where the Supreme
Court's ideal point is strictly inside W(H,S,P), as is SC3 in Figure 4. Then by
definition, any move away from SC3 will make at least one of the three
political actors worse off, and thus will be vetoed by either the President or
one of the houses of Congress.
Consider now the case where the Supreme Court's ideal point is outside
W(H,S,P). Were the Supreme Court to make a decision that falls outside
W('), further legislation will follow. Consider, instead a Supreme Court decision at the boundary of W(-). Any movement away from the point reflecting
the Supreme Court decision will make at least one political actor worse off,
and hence it will be vetoed. Since there is a point at the boundary of W(')
that makes the Supreme Court better off than at any other point strictly
inside W('), the long-run equilibrium must be at the boundary of W(.),
proving the proposition.
With Proposition 3 we can analyze the power of the veto. There are two
cases to consider: one where the Supreme Court decision is on the contract
curve between the House and the Senate, and another where the decision is
on a contract curve involving the President. Consider the former case first,
represented by E 1 in Figure 4. In such a case, since the ideal points of the
President and of the Supreme Court are on different sides of C(H,S), the
Supreme Court decision will be on C(H,S). Thus, the veto power of the
President is of no value to the President. The President cannot force a
legislative outcome that moves the equilibrium outside of C(H,S), as such a
move would imply that either the House or the Senate or both would be
worse off.
Now consider a case where the ideal points of the President and of the
Supreme Court are on the same side of C(H,S). In that case, the Supreme
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Court's decision will be on a contract curve involving the President and, say,
the House, represented by E2 in Figure 4. The Senate would like to move
the legislative outcome strictly inside W('). To do so it has to align necessarily
with the House, since aligning itself with the President is not enough to
overrule a Supreme Court decision. However, any movement away from the
contract curve between the House and the President that makes the House
better off necessarily makes the President worse off. Thus, the President will
support the Supreme Court and veto Congress' overrule of the Supreme
Court decision. The power to veto, however, does not provide the President
with the ability to further shift the political equilibrium closer to its ideal
point. Would the President try to align with the Senate through the use of an
administrative agency, the Supreme Court will reverse the President's action, and the House will veto any intent to overrule the Supreme Court
action.
Thus, the power to veto provides some power to the President. In our
framework, the executive power does not confer the President any particular
advantage. 29 It is rather the ability to veto Congressional reversals of Supreme Court decisions that provides the power to affect the equilibrium.
Thus, with Presidential veto, the Presidents' preferences matter in determining the long-run political equilibrium.
2.4.

COMPARATIVE STATICS

Proposition 3, then, can be used to analyze the comparative statics implications of our model. First, consider a case where the ideal point of the Supreme
Court is inside W('). In that case, marginal changes in the ideal points of the
President, the House, or the Senate will have no impact on the legislative
equilibrium and on the position of the Supreme Court. [Relatively large
changes, however, that take the Supreme Court's ideal point outside W(') will
have an effect on the legislative equilibrium. ]
Now let the ideal points of the President and of the Supreme Court be on
different sides of the House-Senate contract curve. In that case, the longrun equilibrium is on C(H,S), and changes in the position of the President
will have no impact on the legislative equilibrium. Instead, only changes in
the position of either the House or the Senate imply a change in the long-run
political equilibrium.
Consider, finally, the case where the initial long-run equilibrium is on the
contract curve involving the President and, say, the House (El in Figure 5).
Let the ideal point of the President change, say, away from the ideal point ol
the Supreme Court. The contract curve between the President and the
House also moves away from the Supreme Court. From Proposition 3, the
29. Except in the case of multiple equilibria. See note 21.
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Figure 5. Comparative statics on the President's ideal point. H: ideal point of the House; S:
ideal point of the Senate; SC: ideal point of the Supreme Court; P: ideal points of the President.

new long-run equilibrium has to reside on the new contract curve, with the
Supreme Court following the electorate (see, however, Proposition 2 above).
That is, the long-run equilibrium will follow the move in the preferences of
the President.
2.5.

ALTERNATIVE MODES OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

A basic assumption in the previous sections is that in interpreting legislative
statutes, the Court is free to choose, in principle, any point in the policy
space. In this framework, then, the equilibrium consists of a policy outcome
such that it maximizes the Court's utility and is in the core of the bargaining
game between the House, the Senate, and the President. Thus, the location
in the policy space of the administrative agency is irrelevant, as is the nature
of the initial legislation enacting the statute. Confronted with a case concerning a particular set of issues, the Court's choice is only a function of its
current preferences and of the current political composition of Congress and
the executive.
In this section we explore some of the implications of relaxing the assumption that the Court, in making its decisions, can choose any point in the
policy space [for a more detailed analysis, see Spiller (1990c)]. In particular,
we study the implications for agency discretion of the Court having the
power only to reverse or sustain a prior agency decision. The Court, though,
in making its decision behaves strategically, considering its impact on the
legislative process and on the subsequent policy outcome.
The main result is that while both agency preferences and the location
of the initial status quo are important in determining the equilibrium, the
Court's preferences are crucial in explaining the behavior of agencies.
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Agency discretion, now, is constrained not only by Congressional preferences, but by the preferences of the Court. Nevertheless, the main thrust of
the previous sections remains: first, the Court will follow election results as
they change the set of feasible legislative decisions; and, second, the Court,
while behaving strategically, is not able to impose its preferences, but rather
is constrained by the remaining institutions of government.
2.6. A

MODEL OF AGENCY DISCRETION UNDER JUDICIAL REVIEW

WITHOUT PRESIDENTIAL VETO

In the previous sections we have assumed that the President has full control
over the administrative agencies. We showed, nevertheless, that if the Court
can make decisions on a continuum, then the President has no executive
power. That is, Presidential control over the agency does not grant the
President any power to affect the long-run equilibrium. In this section we
relax both the assumption of full Presidential control over the agency as well
as the assumption that the Court can make decisions on a continuum.
Following our previous preference assumptions, we assume here that the
agency also has well defined and stable preferences over the policy space,
represented by strictly convex indifference curves. The agency's ideal point
is represented by point A in Figure 6. We assume now that the Court can
only reverse or sustain a prior administrative agency decision.
These assumptions change slightly the game analyzed in the previous
sections. The game now has four stages. In the initial stage certain legislation
is passed, which determines the initial status quo (represented by x0 in
Figure 6). In the second stage the agency moves by implementing the statute and choosing a point (represented by x1 ). In the third stage the Court
reviews the agency's decision. The Court can either reverse or sustain the
agency decision. If the Court reverses the agency decision, it upholds the
initial status quo, x0 . If the Court sustains the agency decision, then the new
status quo becomes x. In the fourth stage, Congress considers the Court's
decision. The Court's decision, then, determines the relevant status quo at
the fourth stage. Let the Court decision be given by Z(xo,xl). If Congress
wants to reverse the Court's decision, it can do so only by making both
houses of Congress better off. That is, as in the previous version, reversals of
the Court decision will only be undertaken if the Court's decision, Z(xo,xl), is
not in C(H,S). Congressional bargaining, however is not unconstrained. Let
G(x) represent the deterministic outcome to a bargaining process when x is
the status quo. Thus, if y E C(H,S), then y = G(y).
We solve this model backward, by analyzing first the Congressional action
that will follow a previous decision by the Court. From our previous discussion, we have that if Z(xo,xl) is in C(H,S), then the Court's decision becomes
the equilibrium. If, however, Z(xo,xl)) is not in C(H,S), then G(Z(xo,xl))
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Figure 6. Agency discretion in a two-dimensional model without Presidential veto. xo: initial
status quo; x1 : agency's decision; SC: ideal point of the Court; H: ideal point of the House; S:
ideal point of the Senate; G(xo): Congressional bargaining outcome starting from x0.

becomes the equilibrium. When the Court makes its decision, it will consider the optimal response of the legislature. In analyzing the equilibrium, we
have to consider two alternative cases, depending on whether the initial
legislation is in C(H,S), that is, on whether the composition of the current
Congress resembles that of the enacting Congress or not. Letting A(x) and
SC(x) represent those points preferred to x by the agency and the Court,
respectively, the following proposition presents the basic results.
Proposition4. (a) If x 0 e C(H,S), then (i) if A(xo)NSC(xo)nC(H,S) = 0, then
x0 remains the equilibrium; and (ii) if A(xo)NSC(xo)NC(H,S) is not empty
then the equilibrium is that point in SC(xo)NC(H,S) that maximizes the
utility of the agency.
(b) If x0
C(H,S), then (i) if A (G(xo))NSC(G(xo))AC(H,S) = 0, G(xo) is
the equilibrium; and (ii) if A(G(xo))NSC(G(xo))NC(H,S) is not empty, then
the equilibrium is the point in SC(G(xo))NC(H,S) that maximizes the utility
of the agency.
Proposition 4 says that if the current Congress resembles the enacting
Congress, then if the preferences of the Court and the agency are such that
each prefers moving the initial status quo in different directions along
C(H,S) [i.e., A(xo)NSC(xo)NC(H,S) = 0 means that the projection of the
ideal points of the agency and the Court onto C(H, S) are on opposite sides of
Xo], then the initial status quo remains the equilibrium. If, however, both the
agency and the Court prefer moving the initial status quo in the same
direction along the contract curve between the House and the Senate, then
the agency will pick a point, such that it will not be reversed by the Court,
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and such that the point will maximize the agency's utility. Finally, if the
initial legislation is not in C(H,S), perhaps resulting from a change in the
composition of Congress, then the same analysis can be carried out replacing
x0 by G(xo).
To prove the proposition consider the case where x0 e C(H, S) and where
there are no points in the current contract curve preferred by both the Court
and the agency to x0 . Assume that the agency makes a decision, x1, which is
not x0 [it may or not be in C(H,S)I, and such that it prefers G(x1) to x0 .
Observe that, by assumption, x0 is preferred by the Court to G(x1 ). The
Court can either uphold or reject the administrative decision. If it upholds
the agency's decision, then the equilibrium will become G(x1 ) [which could
C(H,S)]. If, however, the Court reverses it, then the equibe x, if x1
librium becomes x0 . The Court's decision will depend on whether the Court
prefers G(xl) to x0 or not. In the current case, however, since there are no
points on C(H, S) that make both the Court and the agency better off than x0
does, the Court prefers x0 to G(xl). Thus, if the agency's decision is not x0 ,
the Court will reverse it. Thus, the only long-run equilibrium is x0 .
If, however, there are points along the contract curve that can make both
the agency and the Court better off than the initial legislation, xo [i.e.,
A(xo)n SC(xo)fC(H, S) is not empty, meaning that the projections of the ideal
points of the Court and the Agency onto C(H,S) are in the same direction
from x0], then the equilibrium is given by that point along C(H,S) that will
not be reversed by the Court [i.e., it belongs to SC(x 0)fC(H,S)], and that
maximizes the utility of the agency. To see this point observe that the Court
will not reverse any decision in C(H, S) that it prefers to xo, nor will Congress
reverse any Court decision that leaves the legal status quo in C(H,S). Thus,
the agency has the discretion of choosing among those feasible policies that
the Court prefers to the status quo. It will then choose that point that
maximizes its own utility subject to leaving the Court at least as well off as
with the original legislation, xo. This shows the first part of Proposition 4.
Similar reasoning will show the second part of the proposition. All that is
needed is to understand that if x0 is not in C(H,S), then x0 is not a credible
legislative threat. Instead, G(x o) is the credible legislative threat.
Figure 6 presents a case where x0 is not in C(H,S). We observe that the
fact that the Court can reverse the agency's decision, and thus trigger Congressional action towards G(xo), restricts the set of feasible agency decisions.
2.7. A

MODEL OF AGENCY DISCRETION UNDER JUDICIAL REVIEW WITH

PRESIDENTIAL VETO

In the previous section we assumed that the President cannot sustain a veto.
In this section we extend this analysis to allow for a more active role by the
President. We model the role of Presidential veto in the same way we did
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before, that is, by requiring all legislative outcomes to be the result of a
bargaining game among the House, the Senate, and the President. All that
can be said of this bargaining process is that it has to be efficient and that it
cannot make any of the three players worse off than the initial status quo.
Unconstrained bargaining, then, will imply an outcome in the area delineated by the contract curves between the three players. Again, let that area
be W(H,S,P).
As in the previous section, let G(x) represent the equilibrium to the
bargaining game when the status quo is x. thus, if yEW(H,S,P), then y
G(y).
As before, the introduction of the President changes the last stage of the
game. Now, it is not only Congressional action that is necessary to reverse a
decision by the Court, the President's actions have to be considered as well.
As before, there are two basic types of equilibria to this game, depending on
whether the current political composition resembles that of the enacting
Congress and President, that is, whether x0 is in W(H,S,P). Proposition 5
presents the main results.
Proposition5. (a) If x0 E W(H,S,P), then (i) if A E W(H,S,P)ASC(xo), then A is
the long-run equilibrium; and (ii) if A e W(H,S,P)ASC(x), then the equilibrium is that point in W(H,S,P)AnSC(xo) that maximizes the agency's utility.
(b) If x0 E W(H,S.P), then (i) if A E W(H,S,P)OSC(G(xo), then A is the
long-run equilibrium; and if (ii) A E W(H,S,P)NSC(G(x)), then the equilibrium is that point in W(H,S,P)NSC(G(xo)) that maximizes the agency's
utility.
The proof of the proposition is straightforward, following the same reasoning as that of Proposition 4; thus it is not presented here. Figure 7 shows
such a case. Observe that the fact that the Court may reverse the agency
restricts the policy outcomes in W(H, S, P) that the agency can actually implement. In Figure 7, the agency cannot deviate too much from the status quo
without triggering a reversal by the Court, which will be sustained by Congress and the President.
To summarize, when the Court can only reverse or sustain an agency
decision, the agency has substantially more discretion than when the Court
can choose, in principle, any point on the policy space. The Court will not
support the legislative status quo in all cases, as changes away from the status
quo may make the Court and the agency better off. The Court, on the other
hand, will sustain the status quo when the agency's interests would move the
policy away from the direction most preferred by the Court. Thus, the main
thrust of the previous sections remains here as well. In particular, the Court
follows election results as they change the set of feasible legislative decisions. Also, the Court, while behaving strategically, is not able to impose its
preferences, but rather is constrained by the other institutions of govern-

A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY OF THE SUPREME COURT

/ 283

x1

ScS
........

(H , S P)
Feasible
Set of Agency

.A

Decisions

X2
Figure 7. Agency discretion in a two-dimensional model with Presidential veto. W(H,S,P):
feasible set of Congressional decisions; S: ideal point of the Senate; H: ideal point of the House;
A: ideal point of the agency; SC: ideal point of the Court; xo: inital status quo; x1: agency's
decisions.

ment. Finally, since casual observation of Supreme Court decisions shows
that the Court makes decisions under both modes of behavior, the conditions
for their relevance remain to be determined both theoretically and
empirically.
2.8.

SUMMARY

It is worth summarizing now some of the main empirical implications of our
framework concerning the rendering of statutory opinions by the Court.
First, changes in Supreme Court statutory interpretations should follow
changes both in the preferences of members of Congress (and in particular,
of those in the relevant committees) and in the composition of the Court.
Furthermore, our model implies that the Court's statutory interpretations
should not be very sensitive to Presidential preferences. Finally, our theory
implies that Court decisions should be followed by legislative inaction. Congressional reversals, if any, should only follow unexpected changes in the
composition of Congress. Thus, our theory can be empirically refuted.
In a sense, causal empiricism has already rejected the theory, as, on
occasion, Supreme Court decisions have been reversed during the same
Congressional term. For example, the Court's decision in GeneralElectric v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (December 7, 1976), was reversed (in 1978) by the
Congress that was elected before the Court's actual decision. Similarly,
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), was reversed by the same
Congress in 1980. As with every theory, however, ours deals with general
tendencies, and thus a more appropriate test of the theory is whether most
reversals develop during the same Congress or following Congressional
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changes. An empirical test of our approach along these lines, however, is
beyond the scope of this article.
In the following sections we use the framework developed above to analyze two Supreme Court cases. Since the purpose of this exercise is not to
provide a legal analysis of those cases, but rather to provide consistent selfinterest rationales for these Supreme Court decisions, the ensuing analysis
will be based exclusively on considerations arising from our framework, and
will not take into account potentially important legal considerations. Furthermore, since the location of the Supreme Court has to be identified as
part of the analysis, this exercise provides a feasible consistency test of our
theory, as analyses of cases involving related issues could, in principle, imply
quite different locations for the Court, providing then a refutation of the
theory. While the following analyses of specific cases do not constitute a test
of our theory, they are useful in showing the potential empirical relevance
of this approach, and in providing new insights on two important judicial
controversies.

3. THE STATE FARM CASE
This case is an example of the Court reducing the ability of the President to
affect policy through administrative agencies.
Involved in this case is the extent of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's (NHTSA's) authority to rescind a previously issued standard. On June 24, 1983, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. et al. v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.. 3 0 The Court held that the
NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint requirement in Modified Standard 208 (requiring the installation of passive restraints in new vehicles) was
arbitrary and capricious. The agency, according to the Court, failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the requirement and
had to either consider the matter further or adhere to or amend the Standard
31
along the lines that its analysis supports.
Let us first discuss the events that preceded the State Farm decision. In
1966 Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act (1966 Act),
with the purpose of reducing "traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to
persons resulting from traffic accidents." 32 The Act directs the Secretary of
Transportation or his delegate to issue motor-safety standards that "shall be
practicable, shall meet the need for motor safety, and shall be stated in
30. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
31. Id. p. 34.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1381.
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objective terms." 33 The Secretary of Transportation delegated this authority
to the NHTSA.
Under the authority of the Act, the Department of Transportation issued,
in 1967, Standard 208, which at that time simply required the installation of
34
seat belts in all automobiles. Having noticed a low level of seat-belt usage,
consider the possibility of requiring "passive
to
the Department started
some discussion, the Department revised
After
occupant restraint systems."
requirements. 35 Two years later,
protection
Standard 208 to include passive
in 1972, the agency amended the Standard to require full passive protection
for all front-seat occupants of vehicles manufactured after August 15, 1975.
The two types of passive restraints considered were automatic seat belts and
air bags. Vehicles built between August 1973 and August 1975 were to carry
either passive restraints or lap and shoulder belts coupled with an "ignition
interlock" that would prevent starting the vehicle if the belts were not connected.
The ignition interlock option proved to be very unpopular and Congress
in 1974 amended the Act to prohibit a motor-vehicle safety standard from
requiring or permitting compliance by means of an ignition interlock or a
continuous buzzer designated to indicate that safety belts were not in use.
safety
The 1974 amendments also provided veto power to Congress for any
seat belts. 36
than
other
system
a
by
satisfied
be
could
that
standard
In 1976, the Secretary of Transportation suspended the passive restraint
requirement, arguing that there would be widespread resistance to the new
system. 37 Months later, however, a new Secretary issued, in 1977, a new
3
Standard 208. 1
mandatory passive restraint regulation, known as Modified
As modified, the Standard required the installation of air bags or passive seat
belts. During the following three years, 39Modified Standard 208 survived
both judicial and Congressional scrutiny.
33. In issuing these standards, the Secretary or his delegate is directed to consider "relevant
available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed standard is "reasonable, practicable,
and appropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle for which it is prescribed, and "the
15
extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes of the Act."
U.S.C. §1392(a), (1976 ed. Supp. V), and 15 U.S.C. §1392(f(l),(3),(4).
34. 32 Fed. Reg. 2415.
35. 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (July 2, 1969).
36. Motor Vehicle and School Bus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-492, S109, 88
Stat. 1482, 15 U.S.C. § 1410(b), and § 1410 (B)(2).
37. Rule-making opening reported at 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 (June 14, 1976). Final decision
reported at Department of Transportation, The Secretary's Decision Concerning Motor Vehicle
Occupant Crash Protection (December 6, 1976) (Coleman decision) Joint Appendix (J.A.) 2065.
38. 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1987); 49 C.F.R. §571-208 (1978).
39. For example, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transportation,the Court of
Appeals upheld Modified Standard 208 as rational, nonarbitrary regulation consistent with the
agency's mandate under the act [193 U.S. App. D.C. 184, 593 F.2d. 1338, cert. denied. 444
U.S. 830 (1979)]. The Supreme Court denied certiorari of the Court's of Appeal's decision.
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With the Reagan administration coming to power, a new perspective on
regulatory reform was introduced. A central concern of the administration
was the simplification of administrative rules implementing regulatory statutes, including the rescission of the passive restraint standard. Since it was
apparent that the House of Representatives, dominated by Democrats,
started to
would not go along with the President's intent, the Administration
40
implement policy changes through the administrative route.
Thus, in February 1981, Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis reopened the rule-making and argued that a one-year delay was necessary
because of the "dramatic changes in the production plans for the 1982 model
fleet," and because, "the economic and other justifications for the ex
isting phase-in scheduling have changed dramatically since the standard was
adopted in 1977."41 The delay was also needed, Lewis argued, to allow
42
NHTSA officials time to reexamine the entire passive restraint issue.
Shortly thereafter, the NHTSA issued a final rule (Notice 25), rescinding
the passive restraint requirement as contained in Modified Standard 208. In
explaining the rescission, NHTSA maintained that it was no longer able to
find, as it had when the Standard was issued, that the automatic restraint
43
requirement would produce significant safety benefits.
In holding that the rescission of modified Standard 208 was arbitrary and
capricious, the Supreme Court noted that the rescission of a standard must
pass the same degree of scrutiny by the judiciary as would the enactment of a
new regulation. The Court found that NHTSA had failed to present an
adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the requirement, and ordered
it to consider the matter further or to adhere to or amend the Standard along
the lines which its analysis supported previously. 44 It is worth investigating,
Similarly, the Modified Standard also survived congressional scrutinity. Congress failed to
exercise its authority under the legislative veto provision of the 1974 Amendments. While no
action was taken by the full House of Representatives, the Senate Committee with jurisdiction
over NHTSA affirmatively endorsed the Standard [S. Rep. No. 95-481 (1977)]. Several other
rulings dealing with Modified Standard 208 were considered during the next several years. For
example, on May 22, 1978, a notice of proposed rule-making was issued in response to a petition
from General Motors requesting more flexibility in the design of emergency-release mechanisms for automatic seat belts [43 Fed. Reg. 21912 (May 22, 1978)]. NHTSA granted the
proposal six months later [43 Fed. Reg. 52493 (November 13, 1978)].
40. See, for example, Thomas, Wildemann, and Brown.
41. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,420 (1981).
42. As part of his proposal, however, Lewis prepared three alternative amendments to the
rule: (a) reversing the order of compliance, so that small cars were to be equipped first; (b)
requiring all cars to comply with the standards by March 1983; or (c) rescinding the Standard
altogether. See Thomas, Wildemann, and Brown.
43. In addition, given the low benefit-cost ratio arising from the analysis of this requirement, NHTSA feared that Modified Standard 208 would be regarded as an instance of ineffective regulation [46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (October 29, 1981)].
44. Some legal scholars suggest that the Supreme Court decision did not simply imply the
application of a standard precedent rule, as before the Supreme Court decision it may have
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Figure 8. The State Farm case. Eo: initial status quo; RI: Supreme Court's State Farm decision;
Ho: ideal point of the House; SO: ideal point of the Senate pre-1980; S1: ideal point of the Senate
post-1980; PI: ideal point of the President post-1980.

however, whether there is a political-economic rationale for the decision.
Figure 8 is a graphic description of these events as they would be interpreted by the model in this article. We first identify the dimension or
issues involved in the case. In State Farm, the Court confronted two issues.
The issue of immediate attention was the validity of Modified Standard 208,
and thus the extent of safety regulation in the automobile industry. A different issue was the extent by which the President can deregulate via administrative rules without the explicit consent of other branches.
Having defined the dimensions, we need next to define the relevant ideal
points for the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The President's
position is not difficult to locate, since President Reagan was very vocal
about his preferences. The new Administration's preferences called for a
substantial reduction in safety regulation, and also for administrative deregulatory power.
The House's and the Senate's preferences, before 1980, were in the other
direction. We focus on the chairs of the committees with jurisdiction over
motor-vehicle safety. In the Senate, the relevant committee was the Commerce Committee (later named the Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee). From 1966 to 1979, the committee was controlled by Democrats. Up to 1976, Senator Magnuson (D, Washington) was the committee
chair. As revealed by bills that Senator Magnuson introduced during his
tenure in Congress, he was in favor of extensive government safety regulabeen uncertain whether the administrative elimination of a regulation should be held to the
same standards as their introduction. See Garland. Others, however, see no new legal ground
on State Farm, but rather the intent to erase a new legal ground developed in the D.C. Court of
Appeals in the decision below. We thank Jerry Mashaw for suggesting this to us.
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tion. 45 The preferences of the rest of the members of the Senate are expected to be at least in the same direction as those of Senator Magnuson.
In 1981, however, there was a change in the dominating preferences in
the Senate. The new chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Packwood (R, Oregon), showed different preferences. By analyzing some of his
legislative efforts during this period, we can see that Packwood supported
more federal deregulation and, to some extent, less safety regulation than his
predecessors. 46
The House committee with jurisdiction over the relevant issue was the
committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. From 1966 to 1980,
R. Staggers (D, West Virginia) acted as committee chairman. In 1981, however, the jurisdiction over motor-vehicle safety was given to the committee
on Energy and Commerce, under the chairmanship of R. Dingell (D, Michigan). Both, Dingell and Staggers, were supporters of government safety
regulation. 47 Thus, as depicted in Figure 8, the preferences of the House,
both before and after 1980, are for less federal deregulation and more extensive safety regulatory provisions than the Senate. 4 8 The contract curve connecting H o and So represents the political configuration pre-1980, with E
o
representing the Modified Standard 208. Following the 1980 election, there
is a new contract curve, with the Senate moving away from the House. The
main change in the Senate's ideal point (and thus in the contract curve) is
along the Federal Deregulation dimension. 49 Similarly, the new President
moves with the Senate. For simplicity, we assume that the ideal points of the
Senate and the President are the same. The change in the political configuration undermines the long-run equilibrium nature of the status quo. In the
short run, however, before the Supreme Court acts, the President can try to
"pull" the policy outcome toward his ideal point, even though
the House will
block any detrimental change to the current legislation. The opening of the
rule-making by Secretary Lewis in 1981, and the rescission of Modified
Standard 208, can be interpreted in this way. (PS1 ) in Figure 8 represents
45. For example, § 1883 (1976) (directing the Secretary of Transportation to issue standards
for fuel economy performance); § 1302 (1976) (to promote safety and health in the mining
industry).
46. § 2038, for example, introduced in the 98th Congress, provided for the deregulation of
the trucking industry.
47. While Rep. Dingell may have been an outspoken critic of motor-vehicle regulation, he
was in favor of safety regulation, as his sponsoring of the 1983 seat-belt bill (H 4175, 95th
Congress), providing for an extensive use of seat belts, shows. See also, H 14,256 (96th Congress)
providing for an increase in consumer protection in relation to drugs and cosmetics. His support
for safety regulation, however, should not imply that Rep. Dingell was not supporting his
constituents (Michigan automobile companies and workers), as some have speculated that safety
regulation provided advantages to the domestic car manufacturers vis-A-vis Japanese producers.
48. Since less-populated states have a relatively larger representation in the Senate than in
tise House, it is reasonable to predict that the Senate will usually be less supportive of regulatory measures than the House. See, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1989).
49. Thus, we should expect the main change in the long-run equilibrium to be along that
dimension as well.
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Table 1. Bills Introduced to Amend the NTMV Act of 1966
Date and title

Sponsor

April 10, 1981;
H 3237

Wirth (D)

October 26, 1981;
S 1773

Danforth (R)

November 24, 1981;
S 1887

Danforth (R)

February 15, 1983;
S 477

Danforth (R)

April 21, 1983;
H 2693
October 20, 1983;
H 4175

Lantos (D)

June 28, 1984;
S 2828

Moynihan
(D)

Dingell (D)

Summary
To amend the NTMV Act of 1966 to require
the installation of passive restraint systems
in small new cars
To amend the NTMV Act of 1966, to require
from all car manufacturers the installation
of automatic crash protection systems in
new passenger cars
To amend the Internal Revenue Code to encourage the use of air bags, allowing manufacturers to claim a refundable tax credit
for the installation of air bags in 1984 and
beyond, and imposing an excise tax on new
cars without this technology
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
and the NTMV Act of 1966 to expedite the
installation of antomatic safety air bags
To enact the Highway Safety Act of 1983
To amend the NTMV Act of 1966 to provide
for more extensive use of safety-belt systems in passenger motor vehicles, in order
to assist in reducing health, disability, and
other costs
To amend the NTMV Act of 1966 to require
the provision of automatic safety air bags in
all automobiles, beginning on or after September 1, 1986

it will block
the NHTSA's ruling. Since at S, the Senate is at its ideal point,
50
position.
NHTSA's
the
alter
may
that
any new legislation
Several bills were introduced in Congress shortly after the February 1981
announcement and before the State Farm decision. As expected by our
framework, however, none of those legislative initiatives were acted upon.
(See Table 1.)
The NHTSA's decision, then, allowed the Senate to achieve an outcome
close to its ideal point without having to get directly involved in the enactment of legislation.
At the time of the State Farm decision, then, the situation can be described as follows: an agency decision has modified the status quo, and has
tilted the balance of power in favor of the Senate, creating a stalemate in
legislative action. It is at this point that we would expect the Supreme Court
to, opportunistically, enter a decision to restore a policy closer to the previous status quo.
would
50. Furthermore, since the NHTSA's ruling will not be supported by the House, we
legal
not expect the Senate to promote new legislation to make the NHTSA position part of the
standard.
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For the State Farm decision to be in the Court's self-interest, it has to be
the case that its ideal point is not to the northwest of the new ideal point of
the Senate. If that would be the case, then the Supreme Court's position
would be improved by the NHTSA's ruling, and hence it should have upheld
it rather than reversed it. Observe, however, that a position northwest of the
new ideal point of the Senate implies a very conservative court, as it would
prefer very little safety regulation and substantial federal deregulatory
powers. We assume, then, that the position of the Court concerning safety
issues and federal deregulatory powers is in between those of the House and
51
the new Senate.
R, in Figure 8, represents the State Farm case. R, is more in tune with
what the status quo was before 1980, since it moves the status quo away from
S, towards H o.
In deciding whether the NHTSA's rescission of the passive standard requirement was proper, the Court had to determine first what standard of
review to apply in general to administrative rulings. As mentioned above,
the Court held that a rescission of a rule is subject to the same standard of
judicial review, "the arbitrary and capricious standard," as is the promulgation of a new rule. Since the NHTSA failed to supply a reasoned analysis
justifying the change in policy, it did not satisfy the quasiprocedural elements of the doctrine. 52 Thus, while restraining the agency on its current
deregulatory process, the Court allowed some extent of administrative deregulatory power, as long as it held to the same standards as the introduction
of new administrative rules.
To summarize, in State Farm the Supreme Court used a procedural standard to reverse an administrative deregulatory initiative that, following a
change in only one house of Congress, would have shifted public policy too
far away from its most preferred point on the new contract curve between
the House and the Senate.
53
4. THE GROVE CITY CASE

The Supreme Court decision in Grove City, on February 28, 1984, involved
the power of the Department of Education under Title IX of the Education

51. By 1983 there was already a majority, albeit narrow, of Republican-appointed justices.
This narrow majority, however, was essentially the same since 1975. Observe, also, that the
Court could have been located to the southeast of the ideal point of the House. But then the
equilibrium would have been a corner solution, namely, the ideal point of the House.
52. Furthermore, the agency also seems to have violated the substantive elements of the
doctrine in at least two respects: (a) lack of records in support of its findings of fact; and (b) failing
to establish a reasonable relationship between its decision, on the one hand, and the relevant
evidence, alternatives, and statutory purpose, on the other. Garland (p. 546).
53. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). For a different political-economic
analysis of this case, see Marks.
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Amendments of 1972. 5 4 The 1972 amendments prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sex in educational institutions receiving federal
funds. The issue at hand was the determination of the appropriate scope of
the Department of Education's enforcement powers under Title IX.
The two sections relevant here are Sections 901 and 902. Section 901
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex by any education program or
activity receiving federal assistance. Section 902, the enforcement provision
for Section 901, provides, in its pertinent parts, that compliance may be
effected by, among other alternatives, "the termination of or refusal to grant or
to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient... ,
but such termination or refusal shall be limited in its effect to the particular
55
program, or part thereof, in which noncompliance has been so found."
The plain language of Section 902 appears to indicate a program-specific
type of enforcement. However, there has been extensive debate on the
meaning of Section 902. Marks (1988) argues that an examination of the
legislative history of the Act points toward the conclusion that an institutionwide type of enforcement provision was intended. It has also been forcefully
argued, however, that a program-specific enforcement provision is more
truthful to Congressional intent. 56
Not only has there been debate at the Congressional level on the meaning
of Section 902, but courts have struggled with the issue as well. Several
federal courts have decided in favor of an institution-wide enforcement
provision. One such example is Haffer v. University, involving an athletic
57
program that did not receive earmarked funds covered under Title IX.
Several other cases have followed the same approach when deciding the
appropriate enforcement type for other antidiscrimination statutes.5 8 On the
enforcement proviother hand, several other courts have interpreted the 59
sions of antidiscrimination statutes as program-specific.
54. In 1972 the Higher Education Act was enacted into law as the Education Amendments
of 1972. Pub. L. 92-318, Title IX, § 902, 86 Stat. 373, 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
55. Id.
56. Garvey, for example, examines the language of several antidiscrimination statutes that
used language similar to that of Title IX. He concludes that the current language of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 all support a program-specific enforcement provision. Each of the
statutes begin with a prohibition against discrimination in any "program or activity receiving
Federal financial aid" and then proceed to make clear that the phrase "program or activity"
means something less than "recipient," "educational institution," or "political entity."
57. 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affirmed 688 F. 2d. 14 (3rd Cir. 1982).
58. As to § 504: Wolffv. South Colonie School District, 534 F.Supp. 758 (N.D.N.Y. 1982)
(school trips covered). As to Title VI: Board of Public Instruction of Taylor Co. v. Finch, 414
F.2d. 1068 (5th Cir. 1969) (assumes institutional-wide coverage); United States v. Jefferson Co.
Board ofEducation, 372 F.2d. 836 (5th Cir. 1966), affirmed en banc, 380 F.2d. 385, cert. denied
subnom; Caddo ParrishBoard of Education v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) (Title VI
institution-wide desegregation order appropriate).
59. For example, Hillsdale College v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 696
F.2d. 418 (6th Cir. 1981) (the entire college as an institution was not a "program within the
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Notwithstanding this debate over the interpretation of the enforcement
provision, the preferences of the committees with jurisdiction over this issue
in both houses can be clearly defined. Marks shows that up to 1980 the
House committee on Education and Labor had stable preferences. The
average mean ADA score of the Democratic committee members was relatively high (a liberal vote on the issue of enforcement is one in favor of
institution-wide coverage). During this same period similar tendencies dominated the Senate committee on Labor and Human Resources. Not only did
a Democratic majority control the committee, but in addition the ranking
minority member of the committee, Republican Jacob Javits, was a principal
sponsor of the original legislation and a supporter of institution-wide ter60
mination.
Thus, until 1980, the status quo could be understood as requiring institution-wide enforcement. E o in Figure 9 represents this policy outcome. We
assume that until 1980 the ideal points of both houses of Congress were very
close in the policy space, both supporting institution-wide enforcement. E0
is assumed to be on the contract curve C(H,SO), where H and So represent
the House and Senate ideal points.
In 1980 a change in the political composition of Congress opened an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to alter strategically the status quo.
Although the Education and Labor Committee of the House continued to be
controlled by Democrats (thus, we keep the ideal point of the House at H), the
Senate experienced a large change. A Republican majority now dominated
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, with the consequent change
in committee preferences. Marks shows that the mean ADA legislative scores
for the Senate committee under Republican domination was lower than the
committee mean under Democratic domination. Furthermore, the new chairman of the Senate committee, Senator Hatch, was a strong supporter of
program-specific enforcement.

This change in the political configuration is represented in Figure 9 by the
new contract curve C(H,S1 ). The Court is now before a divided Congress.
meaning of Title IX"), vacated and remanded, 466 U.S. 901 (1984); Rice v. President & Fellows of
HarvardCollege, 663 F.2d. 336 (1st Cir. 1981) (allegation that the law school at the college in
question received federal funds for its work-study program, without allegation of sex discrimination in school's handling of that program, was insufficient to invoke the protection of the
Education Amendments of 1972); Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Title IX does not authorize Secretary to terminate all federal aid because of any
discrimination in a school system if the federally assisted programs are administered impeccably); Romeo Community Schools v.United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979) (Title IX applies only to students involved in programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance and does not apply additionally to employees of
educational institutions receiving such assistance), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
60. Marks also analyzes the length of continuous service to show the importance of these
legislators.
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Figure 9. The Grove City case. SC: ideal point of the Supreme Court;
8
H: ideal point of the House; So: ideal point of the Senate pre-19 1; S: ideal point of the Senate
post-1980 elections; S2: ideal point of the Senate post-1986 elections; Eo: pre-1980 equilibrium;
E2 : post-1986 equilibrium.

Since the House has not changed, the bargaining set is very small (not
depicted in Figure 9 to avoid excessive clutter). Thus, major legislation will
not come out of that Congress. On the other hand, the Senate will support any
change in the status quo that the Supreme Court would like to undertake.
For the Court to support changing the status quo, it cannot be the case
that the Court is to the northeast of the ideal point of the House. That is, the
Court cannot have a more liberal view than the House, as in that case the
initial status quo would still represent the long-run equilibrium. As in State
Farm, we will assume that the Court is located between the ideal points of
the House and of the new Senate. If that is the case, then, our model would
predict a change in the status quo.
Shortly after the change in the control of the Senate, in 1981, the Court
61
granted certiorari to consider North Haven Board of Education v. Bell.
This case involved the validity of Title IX regulations promulgated by the
Department of Education. These regulations prohibited federally funded
education programs from employment sex discrimination. Although the issue of the enforcement provision of Title IX was not directly involved, North
Haven gave an opportunity to the Court to signal its desire to clarify the
debate, by intervening directly, if necessary. In dicta, the Court expressed
its opinion to the fact that an examination of Title IX's language, as well as of
its legislative history, corroborates a program-specific type of enforcement. 62
While the Court was considering the interpretation of Title IX, several
bills and resolutions were being introduced in Congress on the same issue.

61. 456 U.S. 511 (1982), cert. granted 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
62. North Haven, 456 U.S. 511, 537.
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Apart from their legislative purpose, these bills may have served to commu63
nicate to the Court the different houses' preferences on this issue.
In Grove City the Court went on to make North Haven's dicta the main
ruling of the case. Although deciding in favor of a broad triggering clause
(i.e., that any kind of financial aid even if given directly to students would
trigger Title IX coverage), the Court held that the enforcement provision of
Title IX was intended to be program-specific.
As argued above, following a drastic change in the preferences of one of
the houses of Congress (in this case, the Senate), we would expect the Court
to intervene. The intervention of the Court would bring a new policy outcome, which may well be outside the bargaining area between the Senate
and the House. In fact, this is the case with Grove City. Program-specific
enforcement had been the kind of enforcement Senator Hatch signaled to
the Court as the Senate's preference. While the Court decided against a
broad triggering clause, it sided with Hatch in the most relevant issue. Thus,
64
again, the Court followed the electorate.
Following Grove City, several other bills were introduced both in support
of and against the Court's decision. As predicted by our model, no legislation
65
came out before the new Congress.
In 1986 the Democrats regained control of the Senate, while the Executive remained Republican. It is reasonable to assume that the new position of
the Senate was almost identical to that of the House. Thus, the contract
curve between the House and the Senate collapses to point H = S21 with
H = S2 also becoming the new long-run equilibrium. After this drastic

63. In June 11, 1981, Senator Hatch, now Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, introduced § 1361 to reinforce the program-specific nature of Title IX, to
provide for a narrow triggering clause, to restrict the scope of the Act to students, and, to
include under the jurisdiction of the Act the admission process of recipients. Senator Hatch
seems to have had the Court in mind: "The amendment would dispose of the issues in the
Grove City College versus Harris case, currently on litigation, in which the Department of
Education has contended that Federal aid to a student is sufficient by itself to subject to Title IX
all the activities of whatever school he or she decides to attend." 127 Cong. Rec. S636 (daily ed.,
January 24, 1981). Two other bills were also introduced. SR 478 was introduced on September
22, 1982, and HR 190 was introduced on May 10, 1983. It reported without amendment,
seemingly with the intention of signaling to the Court the House's preferences for institutionwide fund termination.
64. It has been argued that the Court's decision in Grove City was in fact the correct legal
interpretation of Title IX. Garvey (1986) argues that program-specific enforcement is the standard that better fits the rationale under which Congress decided to forbid discriminatory
practices by those receiving Federal aid.
65. For example, §2363 (Feb. 28, 1984: to change "program or activity" to include institution); § 2568 (April 12, 1984: to restore Title IX to its broad coverage in enforcement); § 2910
(August 7, 1984); § 3079 (October 5, 1984). § 431 and HR 700 (February 7, 1985: to restore the
prior executive branch interpretation and broad, institution wide application of Title IX); § 272
(January 24, 1985, to require than in the case of educational institutions, the phrase "program or
activity" shall mean the entire institution).
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change in the political configuration of Congress, our model suggests that
there should be an attempt by Congress to overturn Grove City. In fact, in
1987, Senator Kennedy introduced S. 557. The bill was similar in language
and scope to S. 431. It was introduced under the findings that the Supreme
Court had "unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application" of
Title IX and therefore legislative action was necessary to restore the institution-wide application of Title IX. 6 6 On January 28, 1988 the Senate voted
favorably upon S. 557. The bill was passed by a vote of 75 to 14. The House
approved the bill on March 2, 1988, by a vote of 315 to 98.67
From Figure 9 it is clear that under the new contract curve, Grove City,
E,, is no longer a long-run equilibrium. The new long-run equilibrium
(S. 557) is slightly broader in its enforcement guidelines than the status quo
68
before Grove City, and must be located in the area to the right of E 0 .
To summarize, Grove City provides a good example of strategic behavior
by the courts. In the same way as in State Farm, facing a divided Congress,
the Court chooses to intervene by obtaining support from one of the Houses
of Congress (in State Farm, the House; in Grove City, the Senate). Once
Congress becomes unified again, the Court does not try to maintain the
status quo, but instead allows Congress to adjust the legislative outcome.
Finally, while Grove City seems to be a pro-conservative and State Farm
seems to be a pro-liberal decision, both are consistent with a Court whose
political preferences are at neither extreme of the political spectrum.
5. FINAL COMMENTS
This article provides a microanalytic model of Supreme Court statutory
decisions. Our model combines the rational-choice modeling strategy with
the notion that institutions matter in the design of public policy. We use this
model to understand, in a consistent way, two major recent Supreme Court
decisions. These cases show how the Supreme Court responds to political
change.
In both cases the Supreme Court follows the electoral results by adjusting
to the changes in the composition of Congress and the Presidency. On the
one hand, in State Farm, the supreme Court acted to reverse an admin-

66. § 557, enacting clause, 134 Cong. Rec. S266 (daily ed., January 28, 1988).
67. 134 Cong. Rec. H 565 (daily ed., March 2, 1988).
68. The exact position of E2 will depend on the significance attached to the Danforth
amendment [§ 557, 134 Cong. Rec. S 266 (daily ed., Jan. 28, 1988)]. The Danforth amendment
provides that institutions receiving aid are not required to provide or pay for abortions. The
concern was that denial of abortion or related services would be perceived as discrimination
against women. Reports in the press (e.g., New York Times, March 3, 1988) suggested that
acceptance of the amendment led many Republicans to support the bill, giving Congress the
supermajority needed to overturn a possible Presidential veto.
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istrative policy that was implemented following changes in both Congress
and the Presidency, which, in the absence of the Supreme Court, would
have implied a drastic shift in regulatory policy. In Grove City, however, the
Supreme Court moved to make a new policy following a change in the
composition of the Senate. Such a new policy would have not, in the absence
of the Supreme Court move, come out of Congress, since it would have been
blocked by the House of Representatives. In both cases the Supreme Court
decisions were supported by one of the houses of Congress and, thus, they
could not be reversed by the then current Congress. While one is a proconservative and the other is a pro-liberal decision, both are consistent with
a Court pursuing its own self-interest, as long as its preferences are not at
either extreme of the political spectrum.
To summarize, we see in this article the dual role that the Supreme Court
can play. On the one hand, it can be seen as supporting the status quo, and
restraining both the President and Congress from undertaking drastic regulatory changes. On the other hand, the Supreme Court also plays an activist
role, by introducing policies that change the status quo, even though Congress could not, by itself, legislate such policy changes. Thus, whether the
Supreme Court is activist or restrained depends on the political circumstances. Following changes in Congress that create legislative stalemate, we
would expect the Supreme Court to be activist. On the other hand, following
a major change in the Presidency, we would expect the Supreme Court to
follow a restrained path.

APPENDIX
Lemma 1. Assume that (a) preferences of the House, the Senate, and the
Supreme Court are represented by circular indifference curves in R2; (b) the
initial equilibrium is in the interior of the contract curve; and (c) the electoral
result implies a movement in the same direction of the ideal points of both
the House and the Senate. Then, the long-run equilibrium moves in the
same direction as the ideal points of the House and the Senate, independently of the location of the ideal point of the Supreme Court.
To prove the lemma, observe that with Euclidean preferences the contract curve is linear. Thus, there is a unique long-run equilibrium. Second,
since both the House and the Senate move in the same direction, the con-

tract curve also moves in the same direction. Thus, the set of all feasible
equilibria also moves in the same direction as the House's and the Senate's
ideal points. Thus, the long-run equilibrium also has to move in the same
direction.
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Lemma 2. Assume (a) and (b) from Lemma 1; and that (c), the electoral
result, implies a movement only in the ideal point of one of the houses of
Congress; (d) the movement is only in one dimension, call it x1 ; and (e) the
initial equilibrium level of x1 is below the most preferred point of the Supreme Court. Then the new long-run equilibrium will follow the move in
the electorate. If, however, (f) the initial equilibrium level of x1 exceeds the
most preferred point of the Supreme Court, then the new long-run equilibrium will follow the move in the electorate only if the initial contract curve
implies a relatively low rate of substitution (to be specified below) between
x1 and x2.
To prove the lemma, observe that from (a), the contract curve is linear.
Thus, in a (x1 ,X2) plane, the contract curve can be represented by x1 = a +
bx 2, where a = (X2sXlH - xlsX2 H)/(X2s - X2H), and b = (x1 s - xlH)/(X2s x2H), with xs (xH) representing the ideal point of the Senate (House). If we
assume, say, that the House (Senate) has a higher demand for x2 (xI) than for
x 1 (x2), then b < 0, a > 0. Hence, the first-order condition for the Supreme
Court can be represented by (where SCU represents the utility function of
the Supreme Court)
SCUlb

+ scU 2

-

0,

A = SCUljb 2

+

SCU

22

<

(Al)

0.

Assume, now, a movement in the ideal point of the Senate, such that dxls >
0, dx2s = 0. Then, fully differentiating (Al), we obtain
dx1 _ 2[-(a' + b'x 2 0 ) + bb'(xlo - xisc)]
dx_1s
scUjjb2 + SCU 2 2
dx 2 _ 2[b(a' + b'x 20 ) + b'(xlo - xlsc)]
sCUjjb2 + SCU 22

T -s

where a' = aa/axls = -X2H/(X2s - X2H) > 0, b' = ab/axls = 1/(X2s
< 0. Thus, after substitutions, we obtain that
dx1
= sgn[x 2 H - X20 + b(xlo - xlsc)]
sgn

-

X2H)

or, from (b),
A,

0 <* 1

-b(xlo

-

X1SC)/(X2H -

X20 ).

Thus, if (e) holds, so that x1o - XKs
c < 0, then dxlIdxls > 0. If, however, (f)
holds, so that x1o - x1sc > 0, then the sign of dx1 Idxls depends on the value
of b. Then, for very steep contract curves (high values of -b), increases in
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x 1 s may reduce the equilibrium value of x 1 . Observe that a steep contract
curve implies that the Senate's ideal point changes in the dimension that
most separates the House from the Senate. Finally, observe that assumption
(e) implies that the ideal point of the Supreme Court is below the contract
curve, while assumption (f) implies that its ideal point is above the contract
curve.
We can then state Proposition 2.
Proposition2. Assume that (a) preferences of the House, the Senate, and the
Supreme Court are represented by circular indifference curves in R2; and (b)
the initial equilibrium is in the interior of the contract curve. Then, moves in
the electorate where either only one house moves or both houses move in
the same direction will imply changes in the long-run equilibrium which will
follow the electorate, unless the change is in only one house, and the dimension that changes is (a), one that most separates the House from the Senate,
and (b) the initial status quo implying a larger equilibrium value for that
dimension than that of the ideal point of the Supreme Court.
The proof of the proposition is a direct application of Lemmas 1 and 2.
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